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Abstract
Firms choose debt structure and competing banks choose monitoring inten-
sity. Monitoring improves credit allocation, but creates informational lock-in
eﬀects in bank-borrower relationships. In a competitive credit market, banks
dissipate anticipated profit from serving locked-in borrowers subsequently re-
vealed to the bank as good to attract new borrowers with unknown credit
quality. Consequently, banks’ lending strategies result in cross-subsidies from
good to bad borrowers. We investigate how firms’ choice of debt structure
interacts with the cross-subsidies inherent in banks’ lending strategies. The
analysis sheds light on how dynamic bank competition determines monitoring
intensity, seniority, and maturity structure in bank dependent industries.
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies have shown that banks fund loans that are not profitable for the
bank from a short-term perspective but may be profitable if the relationship with
the borrower last long enough (see e.g. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Cetorelli and
Gambera (2001)). Relationship lending makes such subsidies feasible because the
proprietary information acquired during the relationship produces rents for the bank
later in the relationship that oﬀset earlier losses. If good borrowers, representing low
credit risk, produce most of the bank rent in later periods but all types of borrowers
obtain the initial subsidy, banks’ lending strategies generate cross-subsidies between
good and bad borrowers. In this paper we derive debt-structure implications from
the intertemporal cross-subsidy inherent in banks’ dynamic lending strategies. The
link to debt structure arises because the level of the cross-subsidy depends on banks’
monitoring intentsity which again depends on firm’ debt structure. We examine
particularly firms’ choice of maturity and seniority structure of debt.
Our starting point is that borrowers indirectly through their choice of debt struc-
ture choose monitoring intensity and the dynamic pricing of loans. We show that
increased monitoring intensity alleviates borrowers’ moral hazard problems and re-
duces the first-period financing costs, but results in increased cross-subsidies from
good to bad borrowers. Hence, borrowers choose a debt structure which balances
the costs and benefits from increased monitoring intensity. In equilibrium, the bor-
rowers’ debt structure reflects both the cost (cross-subsidies) and benefits (reduced
moral hazard problems) associated with increased monitoring intensity. Good bor-
rowers do not necessarily favor that banks acquire precise information about their
type since the associated monitoring intensity also implies a high level of cross-
subsidies from good to bad borrowers.
Banks’ role as monitors suggests that banks should be junior claimants (see Fama
(1985)), however banks are typically senior, secured claimants and not particularly
exposed to firms’ moral hazard problems. Our approach suggests an explanation for
why banks have senior claims with low exposure to borrowers’ moral hazard prob-
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lems. Low sensitivity to borrowers’ moral hazard problems induce banks to invest
less in monitoring which again reduces the lock-in eﬀects and cross-subsidy eﬀects
associated with banks’ lending strategies. Banks’ long-term view on borrowers cre-
ates incentives to monitor although current claims are senior.1 Furthermore, our
model predicts that firms having large growth opportunities have bank claims that
are less exposed to moral hazard problems than firms with fewer growth opportuni-
ties. This negative correlation between firms’ growth opportunities and exposure of
bank claims is in our model due to the inherent cross-subsidy eﬀect in the bank-loan
market. The cross-subsidy eﬀect is particularly strong for firms with large growth
opportunities. Consequently, growth firms have particularly strong incentives to re-
duce the equilibrium level of the cross-subsidy eﬀect by structuring their loans (e.g.
seniority of bank claims) such that the monitoring intensity and lock-in eﬀects are
reduced.
These results are consistent with empirical studies of Barclay and Smith (1995,
1996) who found that the debt issued by growth firms was significantly more con-
centrated among high-priority classes. Firms with high market-to-book ratios had
higher proportions of secured and ordinary senior debt and little subordinated debt.
They suggest that this debt structure is constructed to avoid conflicts among credi-
tors and, thereby, reduce the potential for underinvestment in upcoming investment
projects (Myers (1977)). We complement this view by showing that growth firms
prefer high-priority debt because this debt structure reduces the cross-subsidy eﬀect
inherent in banks’ strategic pricing of loans. Unlike other papers, our argument does
not involve the assumption that banks are more willing to make debt concessions
when firms have financial distress than other lenders, an assumption with mixed
empirical support.2
1In a related paper Gorton and Kahn (2000) show that the seniority of bank claims can be
explained in a model where initial loan terms are set to eﬃciently balance the bargaining power
of a borrower and a bank in later renegotiation of loan-terms. See also Repullo and Suarez (1998)
and Longhofer and Santos (2000).
2Gilson et al. (1990) finds that firm’s reliance on bank debt increases the likelihood of successful
debt restructuring while Asquith et al. (1994), James (1996), James (1995), and Franks and Torous
(1994) find that banks typically make fewer concessions than other debt holders.
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We consider a two-period model with the following main features. In the begin-
ning of each period a firm starts a project. After investing in the first project, the
firm privately observes the state of the world. Depending on the state of the world,
continuing the project (as opposed to liquidating it) may have positive or negative
net present value (NPV). As the owner of the firm has a residual claim, and all
financing is through external debt, he always wants to continue the project. The
quality of the second project (success probability) is privately known by the firm at
date zero. Monitoring by a bank reveals information about the first and the sec-
ond project. The model setup captures two consequences of bank monitoring. First,
monitoring improves firms’ continuation/liquidation decisions in the first period (i.e.,
monitoring alleviates firms’ moral hazard problems). Secondly, monitoring creates
lock-in eﬀects in bank relationships (i.e., the outside banks fear winner’s curse when
they compete for borrowers). Since the lock-in eﬀect drives the cross-subsidy eﬀect,
firms take this into account choosing debt structure at date 0.
Firms that have two sequential projects may obtain funding sequentially or they
may obtain all required funding when the first project starts. We consider the first
option as short-term financing and the second option as long-term financing. If firms
choose long-term financing, the loan terms for the second project does not depend
on monitoring information acquired during the first project. Since banks or other
investors have not acquired additional monitoring information about the borrower
when they oﬀer a long-term loan, loan terms will reflect average project quality.
Borrowers compare these loan terms with short-term financing costs reflecting cross-
subsidies inherent in banks’ dynamic pricing of loans. Firms choose debt structure
in order to minimize financing costs and cross-subsidies. We show that firms’ choice
between long-term and short term funding depends on the pool of borrowers. If the
pool of borrowers is of low quality, firms choose (if they are able to obtain) long-
term funding of the second project. In this case our model predicts high monitoring
intensity and that banks’ claims on firms are highly exposed to firms’ moral hazard
problems. If the pool of borrowers is of higher quality, firms choose short-term debt
(or a mix of short and long-term debt) to finance the second project. In this case we
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predict that monitoring intensity is reduced and that banks’ claims on firms are less
exposed to firms’ moral hazard problems. Consequently, we establish a link between
a firm’s choice between long-term and short-term debt and how exposed bank claims
are to the firm’s moral hazard problems. This suggests that empirical studies of debt
maturity should take into account that priority structures and maturity structures
of debt are chosen simultaneously. Our paper predicts that if a firm has both short-
and long-term debt, the firm’s short-term bank loan is more exposed to the firm’s
moral hazard problems and have lower priority than would be the case if the firm
was exclusively financed by short term debt.
Standard debt contracts make it diﬃcult for firms to disentangle the benefits and
costs of increased monitoring intensity. We show how properly designed loan com-
mitment contracts can be used to disentangle the benefits and costs associated with
increased monitoring. We examine a loan commitment contract that is consistent
with empirical observations of such contracts and show that supply of loan com-
mitments may have an important eﬀect on monitoring intensity and firms’ choice
between monitoring and non-monitoring external financing sources.
An important motivation for this paper stems from empirical studies finding
that lock-in eﬀects make banks able to practice intertemporal smoothing of loan-
contract terms (see Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995) and Kim
et al. (2005)). The idea is that if borrowers face moral hazard problems (e.g. risk-
shifting problems as in Petersen and Rajan (1995)), intertemporal smoothing of
contract terms can be value enhancing. Empirical and theoretical literature have
focused on the threat to long-term banking relationships from bank competition or
from financial markets (see Petersen and Rajan (1995), Boot and Thakor (2000),
and Hauswald and Marquez (2005)). In contrast, we ask whether borrowers’ choice
of debt structure enhances long-term bank relationships and monitoring. If fierce
bank competition weakens bank relationships, borrowers may choose a debt struc-
ture which strengthens bank relationships (i.e., monitoring intensity). The basic
insight from our model is that if good borrowers pay for all borrowers’ benefits from
tight bank relationships, the equilibrium debt structure implies weak bank-borrower
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relationships.
This paper builds on papers analyzing banks’ strategic investments in monitor-
ing. In this branch of the literature, banks choose monitoring intensities not only to
improve their loan-allocation decisions, but they also take into account how monitor-
ing improves their competitive position in the banking market (see Dell’Ariccia et al.
(1999)). Ruckes (2004) and Thakor (1996) show that macroeconomic conditions can
determine the extent banks engage in costly screening activities. In contrast to these
papers, we allow borrowers to choose debt structure taking into account that banks
choose monitoring intensity strategically.
It is well-known from Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) that monitoring can gen-
erate informational lock-in eﬀects.3 In contrast to the current paper, these papers
assume that there initially is symmetric information between borrowers and banks.
Consequently, borrowers are not concerned with bank generated cross-subsidies be-
tween good and bad types which the current paper investigates.
The banking literature on lock-in eﬀects is related to the industrial organization
literature on switching costs (see Klemperer and Farrell (forthcoming) for a review).
The switching cost literature does not focus on situations where customers control
the degree of lock-in eﬀects and the level of cross-subsidies between diﬀerent types of
customers. Hence, we think our paper contributes to the switching cost literature by
examining a market where buyers control the degree of switching costs (informational
lock-in) and the associated cross-subsidy between buyer types.
There is a related literature analyzing the relationship between asymmetric in-
formation problems in credit markets and loan structure. A branch of this litera-
ture takes banks’ monitoring intensity as exogenously given and study interesting
questions like number and types of creditors (Bolton and Scharfstien (1996), and
Detragiache et al. (2000)), debt maturity (Rajan (1992), Diamond (1991), Diamond
(1993), and, Flannery (1986)). In contrast we endogenize a bank’s monitoring in-
tensity and let it depend on strategic competition in the banking sector. Another
branch of this literature focuses on how the design of debt contracts influences
3See also von Thadden (2004).
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banks’ monitoring eﬀorts (Park (2000), Rajan and Winton (1995), Besanko and
Kantas (1993) and, Carletti (2000)). In these papers borrowers are assumed to be
ex ante homogenous and, consequently, borrowers choose eﬃcient debt structure
and they are not concerned with cross-subsidies implied by banks’ lending policy.
In contrast, we consider heterogeneous borrowers that choose debt contracts tak-
ing into account endogenous cross-subsidies generated by banks’ lending policy. In
our setting, borrowers are inclined to choose a debt structure inducing ineﬃcient
monitoring intensity in order to reduce the equilibrium level of cross-subsidies.
The model is outlined in Section 2. Section 3 examines the equilibrium when
firms use short-term financing of their projects. In Section 4 we analyze a firm’s
choice of debt maturity and how debt maturity is related to the priority structure
of claims and monitoring intensity. In Section 5 we examine how loan commitments
influence firms’ debt structure (seniority of claims) and indirectly the choice of mon-
itoring intensity. Section 6 discusses some remaining issues. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model and Assumptions
We consider firms with two sequential projects and no own funds. At date zero
a firm contacts investors to finance its first project. After financing is done and
the project has started, an investor, for instance a bank, monitors the borrower.
Monitoring reveals a signal about the quality of the first project. Depending on
this signal, the project may continue or be liquidated.4 The borrower has a second
project which starts after the first project. In Section 3, we assume that the financing
of the two sequential projects is done sequentially. This assumption is plausible in
markets where investors find the second project vague and fear that it not will be
implemented and that their committed funds may be wasted.5 In Section 4 we relax
4In this respect, our model is similar to those of Rajan (1992), Repullo and Suarez (1998),
Park (2000) which also consider how bank monitoring can ensure eﬃcient liquidation/continuation
decisions.
5We could have assumed that entrepreneurs with a positive probability do not discover a second
project at date 2 and potential loans obtained at date 0 are wasted. If this probability is suﬃciently
high, it would be impossible to obtain funding for a potential second project at date 0. To keep
the model as simple as possible, we do not adopt this assumption.
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Figure 1: Timeline.
this assumption and consider long-term financing of the second project. All agents
are risk neutral and the risk free interest rate is zero.
2.1 First project
The first project requires an investment of I1 dollars. The project can either be good
(G) and return cash flow C > I1 if it is continued after date 1 or bad (B) and return
0 if it is continued after date 1. Both types of project can be liquidated at date 1 for
value L < I1. At date zero, the borrower and the investors agree that the probability
of having a good first project is s. We assume that s > 1
2
.6 At date 1, investors
would like to liquidate projects which monitoring indicates are bad and continue
good projects. The borrower, on the other hand, wants to continue independently
of project type due to private benefits. Hence there is a moral hazard problem
associated with the first project. Monitoring by investors prevents borrowers from
continuing projects that should have been liquidated and alleviates thereby the
moral hazard problem. More eﬃcient liquidation decisions reduce costs of funds
and, consequently, borrowers prefer some monitoring in equilibrium. We assume
that borrowers need some monitoring in order to obtain financing; sC < I1. The
monitoring technology is described below.
6This assumption simplified the analysis by making it feasible for a firm to use priority structure
of debt to implement preferred monitoring intensity.
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2.2 Second project
The second project starts at date 2. It is stochastically independent of project 1
and requires an investment of I2 dollars. If the project succeeds it returns cash flow
R and if it fails it is worthless. A good project succeeds with probability θ¯ while a
bad project succeeds with probability θ < θ¯. Both types of second-period projects
have positive net present value (NPV). To simplify the analysis, we assume that the
potential profit from the first project is consumed before the second project starts
and I2 has to be externally financed.7 At date zero, the borrower knows the quality
of the second project but investors only know the distribution of good and bad
borrowers. Hence there is an adverse selection problem associated with the second
project. The share of good borrowers is t.
This setup can be interpreted in the following way; a borrower knows that he
will find a good project at date 2 while banks only know the distribution of borrower
talent.
2.3 Monitoring technology
Banks may engage in costly monitoring. Monitoring reveals both long-term and
short-term information. By examining the current project, the monitoring bank
obtains information about the borrower’s success probabilities in the future.
By investing c(α) = γ
2
α2, where α ∈
£
1
2
, 1
¤
, in monitoring, the banks obtain with
probability α a correct signal about the first and the second project:
First project: Pr(signal = G | G) = Pr(signal = B | B) = α
Second project: Pr(signal = θ¯ | θ¯) = Pr(signal = θ | θ) = α
For instance consider a borrower with a good first project (G) and a bad second
project (θ) Monitoring will with probability α provide a favorable signal about
the first project and with probability α provide an unfavorable signal about the
7Otherwise, we would have to assume that the potential profit from the first project is suﬃciently
low to prevent use of equity to signal entrepreneur type when the second project is financed (as in
Leland and Pyle (1977)).
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second project. If α = 1, monitoring signals are perfect and the monitor has perfect
information about the first and second project, but we assume that this is too costly
to be an equilibrium outcome (the γ parameter in c(α) is chosen such that the the
equlibrium level of α is not a corner solution, i.e., α ∈
­
1
2
, 1
®
).
Only banks that monitor receive non-public information about the quality of the
projects.
2.4 Loan Contracts
There are many competing banks and other investors all of which will accept any
contract that has a non-negative expected return. At date 0 and at date 2 banks
compete by making sequential bids for a borrower. The competition among banks
is considered as an ”English auction” where banks gradually decrease their oﬀered
interest rate (improve their bids) until only one bank is active. This bank captures
the borrower. Banks may drop out at any time, and if they do they are not allowed to
reenter the competition (auction) for the borrower. This type of competition yields
a large informational advantage to the inside bank. Note, however, that our results
are robust to changes in the way banks bid for borrowers as long as banks at date
2 earn more from lending to good borrowers than from lending to bad borrowers.
Loan contracts can have diﬀerent seniority and borrowers may choose seniority
in order to induce their preferred monitoring intensity. In Section 4 we consider
both seniority and maturity structure of debt. In Section 5 we examine firms’ use
of loan commitments.
3 Equilibrium
Suppose that firms cannot secure funding for their second projects at date 0. This
could be because future projects are diﬃcult to describe at date 0 and investors do
not find it profitable to fund projects that are very vague.
We examine the subgame-perfect equilibrium by first analyzing the equilibrium
in the game starting at date 2. The equilibrium level of monitoring intensity, α∗, is
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compared with the eﬃcient level of monitoring intensity, α∗∗. The eﬃcient level of
monitoring intensity maximizes total surplus.
3.1 Second Project
The lender that monitored the first project obtains some information about the bor-
rower and his second project. An outside bank has no information about the bor-
rowers that can be used to separate the θ-borrower from the θ-borrower and must
oﬀer the same loan contract to both borrower types. Since competing outside banks
fear the informational advantage of the insider they bid conservatively. In our setup
where investors bid sequentially, outsiders know that the insider will improve his bid
on financing the borrower until he expects zero profit from lending. Consequently,
outsiders anticipate that they capture borrowers with unfavorable monitoring in-
formation if they are successful in capturing a borrower. Consequently, an outside
investor will require that the borrower pays back D2 (α) = I2E[θ|signal=θ] where
E [θ | signal = θ] = θ + t (1− α)
t (1− α) + (1− t)α
¡
θ − θ
¢
is the expected success probability for the second project given that monitoring has
revealed a negative signal (signal = θ) to the inside bank.8 Since the outside banks
make competitive oﬀers on the negative-signal borrowers, the inside bank does not
earn positive profit on serving negative-signal borrowers. However, the inside bank’s
profit from lending to a positive-signal borrower in period 2, φ2 (α) , is
φ2 (α) = E
£
θ | signal = θ¤D2 (α)− I2 (1)
=
"
E
£
θ | signal = θ¤
E [θ | signal = θ] − 1
#
I2
where
E
£
θ | signal = θ¤ = θ + tα
tα+ (1− t) (1− α)
¡
θ − θ
¢
is the expected success probability given that monitoring has revealed a positive
signal (signal = θ). Notice that bank profit, φ2(α), is increasing in the information
8This required pay back yields zero expected profit to the outside investor.
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advantage of the inside bank (i.e., α). Figure 2 illustrates how the equilibrium face
value of debt and face value of debt yielding zero bank profit depend on the inside
bank’s monitoring intensity.
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Figure 2: Inside bank’s profit on serving positive-signal borrowers.
Notice that the increasing diﬀerence between the two graphs implies that the in-
side bank’s profit from serving positive-signal borrowers is increasing in monitoring
intensity.
A good borrower’s expected profit from the second project (not taking into ac-
count that banks use expected profit to make competitive loan oﬀers when they
finance the first project) is
π2 (α) = θ¯ [R−D2 (α)] .
3.2 First period
We will first examine a good borrower’s preferred bank-monitoring intensity and
thereafter derive which debt-seniority structure that will induce the lender to choose
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the preferred monitoring intensity. Notice that we focus on a good firm’s debt choice
because a bad firm always will mimic a good firm in order to conceal his type to
potential lenders. This "mimicking-equilibrium" is supported by a belief structure
where investors regard firms that deviate from the suggested debt structure as being
of the low-quality type (i.e., the θ-type).9
First we examine the first project in isolation from the second project. A firm’s
expected profit from his first project is
π1 (α) = αs (C −D1 (α)) (2)
where D1 (α) is the required debt payment if the project is continued and lenders’
expected profit is zero (recall that we assume that the bank-loan market is compet-
itive). Note that αs is the probability of having a good project (probability s) and
providing a positive monitoring signal (probability α). If the project is liquidated,
the lenders get the liquidation value and the borrower gets nothing. D1(α) is given
by
D1(α) = {D1 |I1 + c(α) = (1− s)αL+ s (1− α)L+ sαD1} (3)
which implies that the bank’s expected profit from lending is zero.
The firmmaximizes (2) with respect to α and subject to (3). Given that monitor-
ing costs are suﬃciently large (γ is suﬃciently large), there exists an interior solution
where the borrower balances the gains from more eﬃcient liquidation decisions and
more costly monitoring;
α∗ =
1
γ
[(1− s)L+ s (C − L)] . (4)
Since lenders earn zero profit, borrowers take into account all potential losses from
ineﬃcient monitoring and choose the eﬃcient monitoring intensity. Hence, α∗ rep-
resents the eﬃcient monitoring intensity for the first project.
Recall that we have assumed that all second-period projects yield positive NPV.
It follows that monitoring does not improve total surplus from these projects and
that α∗ represents the eﬃcient monitoring intensity taking into account both the first
9As in Diamond (1993) the debt structure preferred by the good type is chosen by all borrowers.
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and the second project. Note, however, that the monitoring intensity determines
the distribution of the surplus from the second projects.
So far we have assumed that borrowers determine monitoring intensity directly
(i.e., specified in the loan contract). We will now examine how debt structure can be
used to induce the preferred monitoring intensity. Consider two classes of debt; debt
owned by banks that do monitoring and debt owned by outside investors without
a monitoring technology available. A monitoring bank is able to stop projects that
monitoring indicates should be liquidated. Let l (≤ L) and d (≤ C) denote the
amount a bank gets if the project is liquidated and if it succeeds, respectively. The
borrower chooses a combination of l and d which satisfies the lender’s break-even
constraint. A bank’s exposure to a borrower’s liquidation/continuation decision
(moral hazard problem) is determined by the diﬀerence between d and l. We denote
claims that carry low exposure senior claims. The bank maximizes its expected
profit,
φ1 (α) = ((1− s)α+ s (1− α))l + sαd−
γ
2
α2
with respect to monitoring intensity, α. From the bank’s first order condition we
have
α(l, d) =
1
γ
((1− s)l + s (d− l)) . (5)
It follows that α(l, d) = α∗ (see equation (4)) if
(1− s)l∗ + s (d∗ − l∗) = (1− s)L+ s (C − L) (6)
or put diﬀerently
l∗ = L− s
2s− 1 (C − d
∗) . (7)
A bank lends the borrower M to finance the first project and the bank earns zero
expected profit;
M = ((1− s)α∗ + s (1− α∗))l∗ + sα∗d∗ − γ
2
α∗2. (8)
The remaining part of the required investment (I1) is borrowed from non-monitoring
investors that earn zero-profit and correctly anticipate monitoring intensity α∗. This
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induces the good borrower’s preferred monitoring intensity and let him capture the
whole surplus from the first project.
In a competitive credit market, the borrower has to carry all costs associated with
ineﬃcient liquidation of bad projects (the moral-hazard problem). Consequently, he
chooses a debt structure which induces eﬃcient monitoring (α∗∗) and liquidation
decisions. Proposition 1 summarize our results so far.10
Proposition 1 In the absence of lock-in eﬀects, the equilibrium debt structure in-
duces eﬃcient monitoring intensity, α∗ = α∗∗. A firm borrows M from a bank and
I1 −M from non-monitoring external investors. Equation (7) describes the bank’s
claim on the firm in case of liquidation (l∗) and continuation (d∗) and equation (8)
describes the amount borrowed from a bank (M).
We will now examine how the second project influences the borrower’s optimal
monitoring intensity.
A bank that monitors the borrower anticipates that monitoring yields an infor-
mational advantage when the borrower needs additional funding. In a competitive
credit market, banks use this anticipated profit to capture the borrower when he
applies for his first loan. Consequently, a good borrower’s total expected profit from
the two projects is
Π = π1 (α) + π2 (α)
= π1 (α) + π2 (α) + (tα+ (1− t) (1− α))φ2 (α)
= αs (C −D1 (α)) + θ¯ [R−D2 (α)] + (tα+ (1− t) (1− α))φ2 (α)
where π2 (α) = π2 (α) + (tα+ (1− t) (1− α))φ2 (α) is total profit the good bor-
rower captures from his second project including the subsidy on the first loan. No-
tice that all borrowers, and not only the good types, get a subsidized loan when
they apply for their first loan. The expected profit of the bank capturing the bor-
rower is equal to the probability of obtaining a positive signal from monitoring (i.e.,
10Note that there are many diﬀerent combinations of (M,d, l) that satisfy equation (7) and
equation (8). Consequently, a firm can induce the same monitoring intensity by having diﬀerent
combinations of (M,d, l).
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(tα+ (1− t) (1− α)) times the profit given a positive signal, φ2 (α). This pricing of
loans implies a cross-subsidy from good to bad borrowers because banks earn more
profit on good than bad borrowers at date 2.
By using D2 (α) = I2E[θ|signal=θ] and equation (1) we can rewrite the good bor-
rower’s profit from his second project as
π2 (α) = θ¯R|{z}
Expected gain
−
"
θ¯ − (tα+ (1− t) (1− α))
¡
E
£
θ | signal = θ¤−E [θ | signal = θ]¢
E [θ | signal = θ]
#
| {z }
Expected financing costs including cross-subsidies
I2
This expression will be useful when we later examine borrower’s preferred monitoring
intensity and the associated choice of debt structure.
Figure 3 illustrates underpricing and overpricing of bank loans to good borrowers
due to lock-in eﬀects (recall that all borrowers get the subsidized loan at date 0).
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Figure 3: Pricing of loans to the first and second project.
Our next step is to examine what monitoring intensity a borrower prefers taking
into account that monitoring intensity determines under- and over-pricing of loans
(as illustrated in Figure 3). Thereafter we derive the priority structure of debt that
implements the preferred monitoring intensity.
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Proposition 2 In order to reduce the implicit cross-subsidies inherent in a bank’s
lending strategy, a firm chooses a debt structure which induces ineﬃciently low mon-
itoring intensity, i.e., α∗ < α∗∗.
Proof: Note that α∗ < α∗∗ if ∂π2(α)∂α < 0 for α ∈
£
1
2
, 1
¤
. Since
∂π2 (α)
∂α
= −
¡
θ − θ
¢2
(1− t)2 t¡
−θt (1− α)− θα (1− t)
¢2 I2 < 0 (9)
Proposition 2 follows. QED.
Corollary 1 i) If
¡
θ¯ − θ
¢
→ 0 it follows that α∗ → α∗∗. Monitoring intensity
becomes eﬃcient when the potential for asymmetric information in the second period
disappears. ii) If I2 increases, it follows that α∗∗ − α∗ increases.
Proof: Follows directly from equation (9). QED.
By reducing the monitoring intensity from α∗∗ to α∗, the moral hazard problem
associated with the first project increases and, consequently, the non-subsidized face
value of the first loan increases fromD1(α∗∗) toD2(α∗). However, this negative eﬀect
is compensated by a weaker lock-in eﬀect and a reduced cross-subsidy eﬀect. By
reducing the bank profit associated with monitoring, i.e., φ(α), the borrower makes
the pricing of the first-period loan less aggressive which reduces the cross-subsidy
eﬀect. In equilibrium, the good borrower balances the benefits from reduced moral
hazard problems (reduced D1 (α)) and the loss from cross-subsidies (overpricing of
loans at date 2). Figure 4 illustrates this trade-oﬀ. The thin arrows represent the
level of over- and under-pricing given eﬃcient monitoring intensity, α∗∗, and the
thick arrows represent the level of over and under-pricing given that the monitoring
intensity is reduced to α∗.
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Figure 4: Reduced monitoring intensity implies less over- and under-pricing (thick
arrows instead of thin arrows).
The firm can implement its preferred monitoring intensity by modifying its pri-
ority structure from the one inducing eﬃcient monitoring intensity, or by borrowing
less from a monitoring bank and more from non-monitoring outside investors.
Proposition 3 A firm implements its preferred monitoring intensity, α∗ < α∗∗ by
either modifying the priority structure of debt or the amount borrowed from a bank
compared with the eﬃcient debt structure described in Proposition 1:
i) Suppose the amount borrowed from a bank is constant. The firm reduces monitor-
ing intensity from α∗∗ to α∗ by making the debt repayment less sensitive to liquida-
tion/continuation decisions (i.e., the firm increases l and reduces d correspondingly
in order to make the expected bank profit equal to zero).
ii) Alternatively, the firm can reduce the amount borrowed from a bank (i.e., reduce
M by reducing l and d correspondingly so expected bank profit is kept equal to zero).
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Proof : Follows directly from equation (5) and equation (8). QED.
Proposition 3 i) is consistent with the generally accepted fact that bank debt
is typically senior to that of other creditors (i.e. a bank gets a large share of the
firm in case the firm is liquidated). In a setting with sequential investment projects,
monitoring incentives provided by strategic competition among banks substitute
incentives provided by the design of loan contracts. Consequently, loan contracts
provide weak monitoring incentives when strategic bank competition provides strong
incentives.
We have shown that firms’ seniority structure reflects banks’ strategic invest-
ments in monitoring and associated implicit cross-subsidies between borrowers. Our
next step is to investigate how the distribution of borrower types influences the level
of cross-subsidies and firms’ choice of debt structure. A change in the distribution
of borrower types (i.e., t) has two diﬀerent eﬀects on good borrowers’ profit from
their second projects;
1. Keeping the bank profit in the second period constant, an increase in the share
of good borrowers decreases the cross-subsidy eﬀect. As t increases the good
borrowers capture a larger share of bank profit generated in the second period.
Since the cross-subsidy eﬀect implied by banks’ lending strategies decreases,
a good firm’s incentives to deviate from the eﬃcient monitoring intensity are
reduced. In isolation this eﬀect implies that borrowers choose debt structures
which induce more eﬃcient monitoring intensities as firms’ average quality
improves.
2. Private information about borrower type becomes more valuable when the
uncertainty about borrower type increases. The ex ante uncertainty about
firm type is most severe if t = 1
2
(equal probability for being good and bad).
Consequently, the inside bank’s informational advantage is particularly large
when t is close to 1
2
(keeping α constant).11 This implies that the inside bank’s
11Note that E
£
θ | signal = θ¤ and E [θ | signal = θ] are most sensitive to improved precision in
monitoring signals when if t is close to 12 .
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profit is increasing when t approaches 1
2
and consequently, all else equal, there
is more underpricing and a larger cross-subsidy eﬀect when the uncertainty
about the firm type is large. This positive eﬀect on bank profit from increased
uncertainty about borrower type (i.e., t approaches 1
2
), implies, all else equal,
that the equilibrium level of cross-subsidy increases. This eﬀect implies that
the good borrowers get stronger incentives to deviate from the eﬃcient debt
structure, and it reduces the monitoring intensity when the average borrower-
quality improves, i.e., t approaches 1
2
.
Figure 5 illustrates how the marginal eﬀect on second-project profit from in-
creased monitoring intensity (i.e., dπ2(α)dα ) depends on the average quality of the
borrower (i.e., t). The figure is constructed by substituting θ = .8, θ = .5, α∗∗ = .8
and I2 = 1 into equation (9) in the proof of Proposition 2.
Figure 5: A good borrowers’ incentives to induce low monitoring intensity, dπ2(α)dα ,
depends on the quality of borrowers in the population, t.
Consequently, the equilibrium level of monitoring intensity deviates more from
the eﬃcient level when the uncertainty about borrower type is large than when it is
low. By using Proposition 4 we can conclude that a firm borrows less from a bank
or have bank debt which is less sensitive to continuation/liquidation decisions when
there is severe uncertainty about firm type.
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The above analysis suggests that the strength of bank relationships measured as
monitoring intensity reflects how important a borrower’s moral hazard problem is
relative to the cross-subsidy eﬀects inherent in banks’ lending strategies.
4 Debt maturity
We will in this section examine the case where firms’ second projects are suﬃciently
well-specified to make it profitable for banks to extend credit to the second project
at date 0. Firms choose priority structure and maturity structure of debt in order
to minimize expected financing costs. As before the bad borrower type mimics the
good type in order to conceal his type.
Let T ≤ I2 be a borrower’s long-term loan obtained at date 0 in order to cover
investments at date 2. Since lenders do not have any private monitoring information
about the borrower when the loan is extended, they expect that the borrower is of
average quality and, consequently, has success probability E [θ] = tθ + (1− t) θ. In
a competitive credit market, the face value of a loan of 1 dollar is
1
E [θ]
and the lender expects to earn zero profit. Borrowers compare the expected financing
costs by using long-term and short-term debt.12
Suppose monitoring intensity, α, is given and not influenced by the debt maturity
choice. A good borrower chooses long-term financing if the following condition is
satisfied.
G(α, t) =
θ¯ − (tα+ (1− t) (1− α))
¡
E
£
θ | signal = θ¤−E [θ | signal = θ]¢
E [θ | signal = θ]| {z }
Expected repayment on a short-term loan
including cross-subsidies
− θ
E [θ]| {z }
Expected repayment
on a long-term loan
> 0
12Recall that in our setting short-term debt is debt obtained at date 2 in order to cover invest-
ments made at date 2.
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The condition compares the expected repayment from borrowing 1 dollar at date 2
instead of at date 0 given that the borrower is good (θ). If G(α, t) > 0, a short-
term loan is more expensive than a long-term loan and, consequently, firms choose
a long-term loan (borrow at date 0 to cover investments at date 2). In Proposition
4 we take into account that maturity structure influences the equilibrium level of
monitoring intensity, αˆ:
Proposition 4 Debt maturity and monitoring intensity.
There are critical shares of good borrowers bt and bbt such that:
i) If t < bt, a firm finances the second project with long-term debt. The priority
structure of short-term debt is chosen to induce eﬃcient monitoring intensity, αˆ =
α∗∗.
ii) If bt < t < bbt, a firm finances the second project with a mix of long- and short-
term debt. Monitoring intensity is below the eﬃcient level but above the monitoring
intensity implied if the firm had only short term debt, α∗ < bα < α∗∗.
iii) If bbt < t, a firm finances the second project with short-term debt. Monitoring
intensity is ineﬃciently low, αˆ = α∗.
Definition of bt and bbt:
If t : t = θα
∗∗
(θα∗∗+θα∗∗−θ)
is on [0, 1] this defines bt, otherwise bt = 0.
If t : t = θα
∗
(θα∗+θα∗−θ)
is on [0, 1] this defines bbt, otherwise bbt = 0. bt ≤ bbt.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The priority structure of bank claims follows directly from the maturity structure
and monitoring intensity described in Proposition 4.
Figure 6 illustrates Proposition 4. The figure also describes the consequences on
the structure of bank claims. If a borrower wants to induce low monitoring intensity,
the bank’s equilibrium claim on the borrower has low exposure to the firm’s moral
hazard problem.
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Figure 6: Long-term debt, monitoring and bank claims explained by the average
quality of borrowers.
5 Loan commitment
A loan commitment is a promise by a bank to lend to a firm up to a specified
amount during a specified future time period at specified terms. According to Duca
and Vanhoose (1990) roughly 80% of all commercial lending in the U.S. is done
under loan commitments.
The terms specify the covenants the borrower must satisfy during the commit-
ment period to ensure the commitment is honored. The terms usually involve ”es-
cape clauses” which give the bank the discretion to not honor promises under ”ex-
tenuating” circumstances (”material deterioration”, as judged by the bank, in the
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borrower’s financial condition).13 See Thakor (1995) for a discussion of banks’ dis-
cretion in honoring loan commitments. In the sample of loan commitments studied
by Shockley and Thakor (1997) virtually all commitments contain an escape clause
that allowed the bank to deny credit if the borrower’s financial condition deterio-
rated. We define a loan commitment in the following way: A loan commitment is
an agreement between a bank and an borrower at date 0 specifying the amount the
borrower can borrow at date 2 and the required pay back (i.e., interest rate). The
bank can either fulfill the loan commitment or cancel it if non-verifiable monitoring
information is disadvantageous for the borrower.
Note that the loan commitment puts some restrictions on what a bank can do
at date 2. The bank is not allowed to renegotiate the contract. If the bank could
freely renegotiate, it would have had the same market power as it would have had
in the absence of a loan commitment, i.e., the loan commitment would have been
worthless for the borrower.
Consider the following loan commitment contract; the bank is committed to lend
the borrower I2 at date 2 and requires pay back
d02 (α) =
I2
E
£
θ | signal = θ¤
unless monitoring has revealed unfavorable information about the borrower.14 Note
that since the bank earns zero expected profit on the loan commitment contract,
all cross-subsidies due to lock-in eﬀects are removed. However, Proposition 5 shows
that the borrower can do better than this.
Proposition 5 Suppose that banks oﬀer loan commitment contracts as specified
above, (I2, d02 (αc)). In equilibrium, firms and banks enter into loan contracts which
induce ineﬃciently high monitoring intensity, i.e., αc > α∗∗.
13The widespread use of "escape clauses" is also discussed in Boot et al. (1993). They argue
that banks may want to build up reputation for honoring loan commitments even in cases where
the formal contract give them the latitude not to.
14Note that the expected type given a positive monitoring signal, E
£
θ | signal = θ¤ , depends
on monitoring intensity α. An increase in α increases E
£
θ | signal = θ¤.
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Proof : Note that repayment d02 (α) implies that the bank earns zero profit from
lending to the second project. Consequently, a good borrower’s profit from the
second project is
Ψ (α) = θ¯
"
R− I2
Ã
α
1
E
£
θ | signal = θ¤ + (1− α) 1E [θ | signal = θ]
!#
not including monitoring costs. At α = α∗∗, there is no first order eﬀect from
increased monitoring intensity on the profit from the first project, but a positive first
order eﬀect on the profit from the second project, i.e., Ψ0 (α∗∗) > 0. Consequently,
the borrower demands a loan-commitment contract which induces ineﬃciently high
monitoring intensity, i.e., αc > α∗∗.QED.
Proposition 5 stands in contrast to Proposition 2. Proposition 2 shows that due
to cross-subsidies associated with strategic bank monitoring and pricing of loans,
firms prefer a debt structure yielding ineﬃciently low monitoring intensity while
Proposition 5 shows that loan-commitment contracts induce borrowers to choose
a debt structure resulting in ineﬃciently high monitoring intensity. The intuition
for this result is as follows. Loan commitment contracts prevent inside banks from
charging a positive markup on loans to positive-signal borrowers. Consequently,
increased monitoring intensity broadens the diﬀerence between good and bad bor-
rowers’ financing costs. Since good borrowers focus on their own financing costs
and do not take into account how increased monitoring intensity increases the bad
borrowers financing costs, good borrowers are inclined to induce overinvestment in
monitoring.
From Proposition 3 we know how a borrower can structure his debt in order to
induce his preferred monitoring intensity. The borrower can either borrowmore from
a bank or he can make the bank’s claim more exposed to moral hazard problems in
the firm (the continuation/liquidation decision). Both alternatives will strengthen
the bank’s monitoring incentives.
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6 Discussion
Above we have examined firms’ choice of debt structure in a financial market where
monitoring is needed to alleviate firms’ moral hazard problems, but creates infor-
mational lock-in eﬀects. Although eﬃcient monitoring intensity can be achieved
through properly designed debt contracts, the market outcome entails ineﬃcient
monitoring intensity. In this section we will address some issues that we so far have
not discussed.
Symmetric information: A first-time borrower may not know how talented
he is (i.e., his success probability). In some cases, the best assumption might be
to assume that the bank and the borrower have the same information about a
project’s success probabilities. If a risk-neutral borrower does not know his type,
he will not be concerned about cross-subsidies between diﬀerent types as long as
the expected cross-subsidy is zero. Consequently, if a bank and a borrower have
symmetric information when a project is financed, the borrower chooses a debt
structure which induces the eﬃcient monitoring intensity.
Overconfident borrowers: It is often claimed that borrowers are overconfident
and that they have excessive beliefs in their own abilities. Overconfident borrowers
might choose a diﬀerent debt structure than unbiased borrowers. A way to illustrate
how overconfidence might change debt structure in our model would be to assume
that none of the borrowers have private information about their abilities but they all
believe that they are high types. Hence in this setting borrowers should have chosen
a debt structure inducing eﬃcient monitoring (there is symmetric information about
abilities). However, the borrowers will behave as they were of the high type and
choose the debt structure described in this paper. Although the borrower is of
average quality, she will choose a debt structure that is supposed to counteract feared
cross-subsidies between high and low types. Surprisingly, we see that overconfidence
induces ineﬃciently low monitoring intensity in our setting.
Multiple bank relationships: By borrowing from more than one inside bank,
a borrower becomes less dependent on a single inside bank and the inside bank’s mar-
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ket power is curtailed by competing inside banks. In our approach banks’ anticipated
market power motivates a bank to spend resources on monitoring. Consequently,
there is a close relationship between monitoring intensity and inside banks’ market
power.
We have emphasized that firms through financial contracts directly can determine
monitoring intensity. Our analysis complements, for instance, Carletti (2000) who
analyzes how the use of multiple bank relationships change banks’ market power
and monitoring intensity. It is in many cases more diﬃcult to induce the preferred
monitoring intensity by adjusting the number of bank relationships than by adjusting
financial contracts; a single bank relationship might yield too much information lock-
in and too high monitoring intensity, while, on the other hand, having two inside
banks might yield too low monitoring intensity.15
However, if the preferred monitoring intensity cannot be achieved by using prop-
erly designed debt structure then the borrower might instead be able to reduce
his financing costs by using several banks. Multiple bank relationships may imply
ineﬃcient duplication of monitoring eﬀorts. In a competitive equilibrium these du-
plication costs must be borne by the borrowers through higher interest rates. But
if other means to reduce market power of banks in the first period are unavailable
(e.g. a borrower cannot use the priority structure of debt to induce the preferred
monitoring intensity), borrowers might choose to have more than one bank relation-
ship. This is because the costs associated with duplication of monitoring might be
smaller than the ”cross-subsidy costs”.
Competition intensity in the banking sector: So far we have assumed that
banks compete fiercely at date 0 and that all potential profit at date 2 is used to
attract borrowers at date 0. It might be interesting to consider what would change if
bank competition became less fierce at date 0. If bank competition at date 0 became
less fierce, banks would not spend all date-2 profit on making date-0 loans attractive.
15In a related paper of Elsas et al. (2004) shows how the benefits of relationship lending can be
reaped when firms have several bank lenders by making one of the lending banks special. One of
the bank lenders has an informational advantage. They show how this may explain the extensive
use of multiple bank lenders (Ongena and Smith (2001)).
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Consequently, the good borrowers would get a smaller share of the anticipated future
bank profit. Less bank competition strengthens borrowers’ incentives to choose a
"low-monitoring-intensity" debt structure which counteracts banks’ market power
due to informational lock-in eﬀects.16 Banks become lazy monitors, not due to
banks’ market power per se, but because borrowers choose debt structures which
reduce banks’ monitoring incentives.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines how strategic bank competition can explain firms’ choice of
debt structure. We consider a dynamic bank-loan market where loan terms in se-
quential periods are interlinked and borrowers minimize total financing costs.
In a competitive bank-loan market where banks know that they on average will
earn profit on borrowers in later periods, banks make aggressive loan oﬀers in the
first period. Since banks earn more profit on borrowers revealed to the bank as
good than on bad borrowers, the good borrowers pay for the aggressive pricing of
all loans in the first period. Consequently, dynamic pricing of bank loans results
in cross-subsidies from good to bad borrowers. We show how borrowers can use
maturity structure, seniority structure, and loan commitments to counteract the
cross-subsidy eﬀect associated with banks’ dynamic pricing of loans.
16This argument implies that banks’ market power induce borrowers to weaken their bank rela-
tionships (i.e., lower monitoring intensity).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4. G(α) can be rewritten by using the expressions for
E [θ | signal = θ], E £θ | signal = θ¤ , and E [θ]. After some tedious but straight
forward manipulations of this expression we have
G(α, t) =
t(1− t)2
¡
θ − θ
¢2
(2α− 1)
−
¡
tθ + (1− t) θ
¢ ¡¡
θα+ θα− θ
¢
t− θα
¢ .
Observe that sign [G(α)] = −sign
£¡
θα+ θα− θ
¢
t− θα
¤
.
Part i): If t < bt we have that G(α∗∗, t) > 0 and a firm chooses long-term debt
to finance the second project. Priority structure of the short-term debt spent on
the first project is chosen such that bank monitoring is eﬃcient (there are no cross-
subsidies due to lock-in eﬀects in this case). bt is given by ¡θα∗∗ + θα∗∗ − θ¢ t−θα∗∗ =
0 or t = θα
∗∗
(θα∗∗+θα∗∗−θ)
if this implies that bt is on [0, 1] and bt = 0 otherwise.
Part ii): If t > bt, it follows from the above calculations that G(α∗∗, t) < 0 and
a firm chooses to include at least some short-term debt. Furthermore, note that if
G(α∗, t) > 0, firms will not choose exclusively short-term debt.
From Corollary 1 ii) we have that α∗ is decreasing in the short-term loan obtained
at date 2. Furthermore, note that θα
(θα+θα−θ)
is decreasing in α (i.e.,
µ
θα
(θα+θα−θ)
¶0
=
− θθ
(θα−θ+θα)
2 < 0). Consequently, the firm increases short-term funding of the second
project until G(α, t) change sign from negative to positive.
For t > θα
∗
(θα∗+θα∗−θ)
, the firm find it profitable to have only short-term debt and,
consequently, bbt = θα∗
(θα∗+θα∗−θ)
represents an upper limit on the interval where firms
mix between long term and short term debt to finance the second project.
Part iii): If t >bbt we have that G(α∗, t) < 0 and a firm chooses short-term funding
of the second project. QED.
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